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1. Introduction
Consequentialist moral theories and nonhuman animals share a long and compli-
cated history.1 On one hand, some of the earliest Western philosophers to take seriously 
the moral status of nonhuman animals were the British utilitarians Jeremy Bentham, 
J. S. Mill, and Henry Sidgwick. Moreover, contemporary utilitarian Peter Singer is often 
credited with having started the modern-day animal rights movement with the publica-
tion of Animal Liberation. Consequentialist principles motivate many animal advocates 
in general, and they are at the foundation of the effective animal advocacy movement in 
particular.2
On the other hand, many philosophers and advocates question whether consequen-
tialism adequately respects the moral status of nonhuman animals, in much the same 
way that they question whether consequentialism adequately respects the moral status 
of humans. Familiar critiques of consequentialism emerge with new life in the context of 
assessing the moral status of nonhuman animals, such as the critique that consequen-
tialism regards individuals as fungible receptacles of value, which is to be promoted 
regardless of the means of its promotion.
In this chapter we will focus on two related issues that arise for consequentialists regard-
ing nonhuman animals, one regarding domesticated animals and the other regarding 
1 This paper benefited from feedback from and discussion with Mark Budolfson, Tomi Francis, 
Maryse Mitchell-Brody, Doug Portmore, Abraham Rowe, Alexa Stonebarger, Travis Timmerman, and 
members of the 2018 Global Priorities Institute summer works in progress group. We have also 
benefited from countless conversations with many animal advocates over the years.
2 Animal Charity Evaluators (2017).
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wild animals. Regarding domesticated animals, some philosophers believe that conse-
quentialism results in an implausibly pro-exploitation stance, according to which, if 
farmed animals have positive well-being, then we are morally permitted if not required 
to increase the number of farmed animals in the world, all else equal. Regarding wild 
animals, some philosophers believe that consequentialism results in an implausibly 
anti-conservationist stance, according to which, if wild animals have negative well-
being, then we are morally permitted if not required to decrease the number of wild 
animals in the world, all else equal.
This chapter assesses whether standard forms of consequentialism have these results. 
Our approach echoes arguments from numerous consequentialist writers before us, 
such as Henry Sidgwick and R. M. Hare. We should make a distinction between criteria 
of rightness, which determine which actions are right in theory, and decision procedures, 
which we use to decide which actions to perform in practice.3 When we do, we find that 
consequentialism as a criterion of rightness recommends a partly consequentialist, partly 
nonconsequentialist decision procedure for most people in most situations. In our view, 
this partly consequentialist, partly nonconsequentialist decision procedure conflicts 
with pro-exploitation and anti-conservation stances. Thus, we will argue, the conse-
quentialist case for abolition of animal agriculture and conservation of wild animal hab-
itats is stronger than many philosophers appreciate.
Before we begin, we should make some caveats about the scope of our discussion. 
First, there are many normative questions about which consequentialists disagree, some 
which bear on the topics that we discuss. These questions include: Should we accept 
hedonism, desire satisfactionism, or something else as our theory of the good? Should 
we accept act consequentialism, rule consequentialism, or something else as our theory 
of the right? And so on. We will not be able to discuss all these issues here. Instead, we 
will focus on classical utilitarianism (i.e., actualist, hedonist, maximizing,4 totalist, act 
consequentialism), and we will note issues about which different consequentialist theo-
ries have different implications.
Second, there are many empirical questions about which consequentialists disagree, 
some of which bear on the topics that we discuss as well. For example, do farmed ani-
mals and wild animals in fact have positive or negative well-being? Does our individual 
behavior make a difference regarding how many farmed animals or wild animals are in 
the world? And so on. Once again, we will not be able to discuss all these issues here. 
Instead, we will stipulate answers to these questions for the sake of discussion where 
necessary, and we will allow these questions to remain open where possible. In all cases, 
we will do our best to note these questions where they arise and to explain why we 
approach them in the way that we are.
3 Feldman (1986); Hare (1981); Parfit (1984, 24–28); Sidgwick (1874, 489–490).
4 We take maximizing consequentialism to be compatible with certain forms of scalar 
consequentialism, such as those developed by Gustafsson (2016) and Sinhababu (2018), in that all such 
views regard maximizing the good as uniquely maximally right.
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Third, and relatedly, we will not provide a conclusive answer to the questions we are 
considering. How many domesticated and wild animals there should be, and what we 
should do in order to realize these population levels, are extraordinarily complicated 
questions that require comprehensive normative and empirical analysis to answer. 
Instead, we will do the following. First, we will situate nonhuman animals in conse-
quentialist theory. Second, we will summarize and evaluate arguments that philoso-
phers have made regarding consequentialism, farmed animals, and wild animals. Third, 
we will introduce a set of considerations that we take to provide strong, and possibly 
decisive, support for abolitionist and conservationist stances from a consequentialist 
perspective.
2. Background
2.1. Situating Animals in Consequentialist Theory
We take consequentialism to be a family of moral theories according to which the right-
ness of actions is entirely a function of their consequences. Philosophers disagree widely 
about the scope of this family.5 As such, and for the sake of simplicity and specificity, we 
focus on paradigmatic forms of consequentialism which are impartially benevolent and 
which reject the act/omission distinction and other standard deontological distinctions.
Understood in this way, consequentialism has historically been a more species- 
egalitarian family of moral theories than its competitors. This is partly due to the influ-
ence of classical utilitarians, who appreciated that a principled, impartially benevolent, 
welfarist moral theory implies that all sentient beings have equal moral standing. As 
Bentham famously stated, “The question is not, Can they reason?, nor Can they talk? 
but, Can they suffer?”6 By contrast, nonconsequentialist theorists such as Kantians and 
contractualists have for the most part only recently begun to accept that nonhumans can 
have moral standing at all.7 Our view is that the historically consequentialist view is 
correct. We therefore assume throughout that all animals are equal, in the sense that all 
animals’ interests merit equal moral consideration.
Much of the modern-day project of determining how to maximize impartial good is 
taken up by the effective altruism community. Effective altruism is, broadly, the project of 
using evidence and reason to determine how to improve lives as much as possible, and then 
acting accordingly.8 While effective altruism is compatible with other moral theories, many 
people see it as characteristically consequentialist. This is partly because consequentialists 
such as Toby Ord and Peter Singer developed the idea of effective altruism, and partly 
because the idea of effective altruism focuses centrally on maximizing good outcomes.9
5 Portmore (2009); Sinnott-Armstrong (2019). 6 Bentham (1879).
7 For examples, see Donaldson and Kymlicka (2011), Korsgaard (2018), and Rowlands (1997).
8 MacAskill (2017).
9 In a 2017 survey, about two-thirds of EAs reported accepting or leaning toward consequentialism.
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Effective altruists assess the priority of different focus areas using three heuristics: 
importance, tractability, and neglectedness.10 A problem is more important to the extent 
that solving it would make a positive difference to the world. A problem is more tracta-
ble to the extent that it is easy to solve. A problem is more neglected to the extent that few 
people are working on solving it. While there are important limitations to this framework,11 
when properly applied it serves as a useful guide to identifying the problems that are, in 
consequentialist terms, the most important problems to address.
Using the importance, tractability, neglectedness framework, effective altruists have 
identified three major areas as among the highest-priority cause areas for altruistic 
intervention: animal welfare, global health and development, and existential risk reduc-
tion. Moreover, within animal welfare, effective altruists think that farmed animal wel-
fare and wild animal welfare are the highest-priority issues.
Consider farmed animal welfare first. This issue is highly important due to its immense 
scale: we harm 100+ billion domesticated animals and hundreds of billions of wild ani-
mals per year in our global food system.12 This issue is also highly neglected: people 
devote much less time, energy, and money to farmed animal welfare than to other issues, 
such as companion animal welfare. Finally, this issue is also highly tractable: people are 
currently pursuing a variety of promising approaches involving social, institutional, 
political, and technological change.
Now consider wild animal welfare. This issue is even larger in scale than farmed ani-
mal welfare: anywhere between 1013–1016 vertebrates and 1018–1022 invertebrates live in 
the wild at any given time, many with low levels of well-being.13 This issue is also even 
more neglected than farmed animal welfare: hardly anyone is working on it at all. 
However, wild animal welfare is not nearly as tractable as farmed animal welfare, since 
we currently lack the political will to promote wild animal welfare as well as knowledge 
about what we can do to efficiently improve the lives of wild animals.14
While effective altruists agree that farmed animal welfare is more tractable than wild 
animal welfare, there are many uncertainties with respect to both issues. With respect to 
farmed animal welfare, we need to know whether to aim to abolish or regulate animal 
agriculture, as well as how to pursue these ends. With respect to wild animal welfare, we 
need to know whether to aim to increase, decrease, or maintain wild animal popula-
tions, as well as how to pursue these ends. In both cases, we need to strike a balance 
between a willingness to be humble in the face of difficult questions and a willingness to 
be proactive with respect to urgent issues.
2.2. Sophisticated Consequentialism
We believe that, as consequentialists think about how to answer these questions, it is 
important to appreciate the distinction between (a) criteria of rightness, that is, the prin-
ciples that determine which actions are right in theory, and (b) decision procedures, that 
10 MacAskill (2015). 11 Dickens (2016); Wiblin (2016).
12 Schlottmann and Sebo (2018). 13 Tomasik (2018). 14 Delon and Purves (2018).
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is, the principles that agents use to decide which actions to perform in practice.15 This 
distinction is important because, as many consequentialists have observed, it might not 
always be the case that consulting a particular principle, such as the principle of utility, is 
the best way to comply with that principle.
There are many reasons why the decision procedures we ought to use might be 
 different from our criteria of rightness. One reason concerns complexity. Insofar as 
we lack the time, energy, and information necessary to apply complex principles, 
we should apply simpler principles instead. Another concerns biases and heuristics. 
Insofar as complex principles create more space for bias to operate, we should apply 
simpler principles instead. Another concerns moral psychology. Insofar as our 
behavior depends on factors other than explicit moral reasoning, we should attend to 
these factors as well. And so on.
With that in mind, our view, stated roughly and generally, is that consequentialist 
 theorists who have defended so-called indirect consequentialism, sophisticated conse-
quentialism, or two-level consequentialism are correct.16 Classical utilitarianism is cor-
rect as criterion of rightness: we morally ought to perform the acts which maximize net 
pleasure for all sentient beings from now until the end of time. However, for most people 
in most situations, a partly consequentialist and partly nonconsequentialist framework 
is the optimal decision procedure. According to this kind of decision procedure, we 
should aim to maximize expected utility, but only where this is compatible with respect-
ing rights, developing and maintaining relationships of care, and developing and main-
taining virtuous character traits. While different decision procedures may be optimal 
for different people in different contexts, decision procedures of this kind generally 
strike a good balance between (a) preserving the benefits of consequentialist thinking 
and (b) limiting the risks of consequentialist thinking.
With that said, we should qualify this claim in two ways. First, we are open to the pos-
sibility that we are wrong. After all, these are difficult questions, and biases and heuris-
tics can affect our application of any decision procedure. For example, once we accept 
that we should accept a partly nonconsequentialist decision procedure, it might be 
tempting to simply select whatever decision procedure tells us what we want to hear, and 
then rationalize our choice on specious consequentialist grounds. We will not be able to 
fully address this concern here, but we will note where it might be arising, and we will 
approach our own analysis with a degree of skepticism accordingly.
Second, we suspect that, even if we are right, there can be exceptional cases where a fully 
consequentialist decision procedure which suspends nonconsequentialist constraints is 
best. For example, it might be that an optimal decision procedure would allow you to 
decide to kill someone if doing so is the only way to save 1,000,000 people, even though 
you should ordinarily regard killing someone as prohibited on nonconsequentialist 
grounds. In this case, you would not be denying the indirect value of nonconsequentialist 
15 Hare (1981).
16 Brandt (1984); Cocking and Oakley (1995); Hare (1981); McNaughton (1998); Sidgwick (1874); 
Wiland (2007).
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considerations. You would instead simply be accepting that the nature of this case makes it 
clear that a fully consequentialist decision procedure is ideal. However, we think that cases 
of legitimate suspension of nonconsequentialist constraints as weighty as rights are rare, 
and they may not occur at all for many people.
We think that this kind of “sophisticated consequentialism” has interesting implica-
tions for a wide range of issues in animal ethics. For example, we think that it implies 
that we should support the development of a broad, pluralistic animal advocacy move-
ment that involves many different, and seemingly conflicting, approaches.17 In what fol-
lows, we will focus on implications regarding how many farmed and wild animals there 
should be in the world and what we should be doing to promote these population levels. 
Without attempting to fully answer these questions here, we will argue that there is a 
stronger consequentialist case for abolition of animal agriculture and conservation of 
wild animal habitats than many philosophers assume.
3. Farmed Animals and the Logic  
of the Larder
3.1. Background
The standard argument that consequentialists should aim to reduce farmed animal pop-
ulations, all else equal, relies on the assumption that farmed animals have net negative 
well-being. At least in countries with developed, industrialized economies, which will 
be our focus, there are good reasons for embracing this assumption. For brevity, con-
sider the fates of farmed chickens, who make up over 99 percent of the population of 
farmed land animals in the United States. Approximately 99.9 percent of chickens farmed 
for meat and 98.2 percent of chickens farmed for eggs live in concentrated animal feed-
ing operations (CAFOs).18 Lori Gruen writes on the lives of such chickens:19
Most of these hens are kept in small wire cages, called “battery cages,” with between 
three and eight other hens. The battery cages are stacked on top of each other 
indoors in sheds that can contain upward of 100,000 hens. The battery cage is so 
small that the hens are unable to stretch their wings or turn around. Because of the 
stress, boredom, fear, and close quarters, hens will peck at each other, so most are 
routinely debeaked, a process that involves a hot blade cutting off the tip of the beak 
through a thick layer of highly sensitive tissue. Debeaking causes lasting pain and 
impairs the hen’s ability to eat, drink, wipe her beak, and preen normally.
17 Sebo and Singer (2018).
18 CAFOs are defined by the EPA as farms with upward of 37,500 meat chickens and upward of 
25,000 laying hens, respectively (Reese 2019).
19 Gruen (2011, 83).
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Many other impacts reduce chicken well-being as well—the pain and stress of laying 
each of 300 eggs per year, an inability to stand due to rapid growth leading to chronic leg 
pain and constant sores from sitting in their own excrement, and more—and even set-
ting these aside it is clear that animals raised on such CAFOs have profoundly negative 
well-being.
However, even if the vast majority of farmed animals have negative well-being, there 
may be some farmed animals who presently exist (such as some grass-fed “beef ” cattle) 
or who might exist in the future (such as genetically engineered, pain-free chickens) 
who have neutral or positive well-being. Dwelling on such cases has led some to defend 
the so-called Logic of the Larder (hereafter LARDER):20
[Where farmed animals have positive well-being,] the consequence to others of 
buying that meat in the grocery store, rather than asparagus, is good; you create 
farm animals whose lives are worth living. . . . So if you, like me, think your actions 
are more moral when you do more good for others, you should agree with me that 
[this] meat is moral, and veggies are immoral.
The idea here is that, if consequentialism is true, and if some farmed animals have 
positive well-being, then there is a pro tanto moral reason to promote a world that 
includes these farmed animals instead of a world that excludes them.21 This might mean 
that we have pro tanto moral reasons to eat animal products that come from such a farm 
and to support the existence of such a farm in other ways. Many defenders of LARDER 
further suppose that these moral reasons are ultimately undefeated, such that, all things 
considered, consequentialists ought to eat some “humanely raised” meat.
The weakest version of LARDER, on which eating some farmed animals is permissible 
because it is not bad to cause farmed animals with positive well-being to exist, makes 
weak assumptions about population axiology. In particular, it assumes a weak version of 
the Mere Addition Principle:22 that adding animals with positive well-being to our 
actual world does not make the world worse, holding everything else fixed. It is not com-
mitted to rejecting the Asymmetry Intuition, or critical level or averageist axiologies, 
though each of these axiologies will change the conditions under which adding animals 
with positive well-being to the world would not worsen that world. The strongest 
version of LARDER, supported by classical utilitarianism, implies that eating some 
20 Hanson (2002). See also Cowen (2005); Hare (1993); Posner (2004); Salt (1914); Singer (1999); and 
Stephen (1896).
21 The question whether eating meat in fact increases the demand for meat and so causes future 
animals to exist is one that has been thoroughly explored elsewhere, and we do not take it up here. For 
our part, we find persuasive Kagan’s (2011) reasoning. For a persuasive parallel discussion in the context 
of climate change, see Broome (2018). See also Budolfson (2015); Gruen and Jones (2016); Schlottmann 
and Sebo (2018); and Singer (2011).
22 For more on the Mere Addition Principle, see Arrhenius (2012).
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farmed animals is required because it is good to cause farmed animals with positive well-
being to exist.
While many people writing on LARDER have focused on its implications for the eth-
ics of eating animals, it is clear that the argument has broader implications for our rela-
tionships with nonhuman animals. If consequentialism requires agents to take actions 
which increase the number of farmed animals with positive well-being, all else equal, 
then it might require us to support animal agriculture in other ways, too, for example by 
aiming to regulate rather than abolish animal agriculture as an industry. Whereas ani-
mal rights theory regards animal farming as anathema, consequentialism on this inter-
pretation might regard it as welcome.
Some philosophers thus reply to LARDER by rejecting consequentialism. They claim 
that supporting animal agriculture is wrong whether or not farmed animals have posi-
tive well-being, on the grounds that animal agriculture treats animals merely as means, 
cultivates vicious attitudes toward animals, or places us in oppressive relationships with 
animals.23
Other philosophers reply to LARDER by rejecting the idea that consequentialism 
supports increasing farmed animal populations. For example, Matheny and Chan argue 
that supporting animal agriculture is unlikely to maximize value all things considered, 
since other uses of our time, energy, and money will have better net consequences.24
Other philosophers reply to LARDER by accepting the idea that consequentialism 
supports increasing farmed animal populations. If engaging in or supporting animal 
agriculture is a net benefit for farmed animals, then we are indeed morally permitted, if 
not morally required, to engage in or support animal agriculture, all else equal.
We are sympathetic with all of these replies. First, we agree with nonconsequentialist 
critics of LARDER that we should treat animals as ends, cultivate virtuous character 
traits toward animals, and cultivate relationships of care with animals. However, we 
think that we should do these things from within a consequentialist framework—
because doing these things maximizes net pleasure in the world—rather than as an 
alternative to a consequentialist framework.
Second, we agree with consequentialist critics of LARDER that animal agriculture is 
unlikely to be a net benefit for farmed animals in practice. However, we think that there 
is a deeper reason for consequentialists to reject LARDER, which is that even treating 
LARDER as an open question is likely to be a net harm for nonhuman animals and other 
sentient beings in most cases in practice, for precisely the reasons that nonconsequen-
tialists are discussing.25
Third, we agree with consequentialist proponents of LARDER that, if animal agricul-
ture is a net benefit for farmed animals and other sentient beings, then we are morally 
permitted, if not morally required, to support animal agriculture, all else equal, in theory. 
23 Donaldson and Kymlicka (2011, chaps. 2 and 4); Gruen (2011, chap. 3).
24 Matheny and Chan (2005).
25 As we will note, others have explored this option, too, including Fischer (unpublished 
manuscript), Gruen (2011), and Singer (2011).
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However, we also think that we are not morally permitted to support animal agriculture 
in most cases in practice, again for the reasons that nonconsequentialists are discussing.
Our aim in what follows, then, is to argue that a consequentialist criterion of rightness 
requires us to accept a partly nonconsequentialist decision procedure, and that this 
decision procedure prohibits eating animals, as well as maintaining and supporting sys-
tems that confine, kill, and exploit animals as a matter of principle (with certain caveats 
that we explain). This is centrally because supporting animal agriculture negatively 
shapes our individual beliefs, values, and practices, and because having a system of ani-
mal farming at all negatively shapes our collective beliefs, values, and practices. In both 
cases, the result is that we tend to have attitudes that devalue animals and practices that 
harm them.
3.2. The Individual Effects of Animal Exploitation
We begin with the individual effects of animal exploitation. We here follow the literature in 
focusing on the psychological effects of eating meat, though we will consider later whether 
and to what degree these effects apply to other activities that involve exploitation, too.
Our argument has two parts. First, theoretical and empirical moral psychology sup-
port the idea, originally found in ecofeminist thought, that eating animals leads humans 
to view animals as having diminished mental life and moral status. When we condone 
animal agriculture, in word, thought, or deed, we condition ourselves to devalue and, as 
a result, harm other animals. Second, theoretical and empirical motivational psychol-
ogy supports the idea that so-called conscientious omnivores typically fail to be as con-
scientious as they would like to think. That is, when we adopt a policy of eating happy 
animals, we will likely end up eating unhappy animals as well. Thus, we will argue, con-
sequentialists should adopt a policy of not eating animals at all (with certain caveats that 
we discuss).26
Part one of our argument—that eating animal products conditions us to see animals 
as objects rather than subjects—has precedent among consequentialists and nonconse-
quentialists alike. For example, Peter Singer argues:27
[Practically], it would be better to reject altogether the killing of animals for food, 
unless one must do so to survive. Killing animals for food makes us think of them as 
objects that we can use as we please. . . . To foster the right attitudes of consideration 
26 Both of these arguments assume actualism rather than possibilism about obligation logic. 
Actualism is the view that I ought to take an action if and only if what will happen if I take that action 
is better than what will happen if I do not take that action, whereas possibilism is the view that I ought 
to take an action if and only if taking that action is part of the best maximally-specific act-set that I can 
perform. Whether possibilists should accept our arguments depends a great deal on the details of their 
individual views. For more on this distinction, see: Cohen and Timmerman (2016) and Cohen and 
Timmerman in this volume.
27 Singer (2011, 134).
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for animals . . . it may be best to make it a simple principle to avoid killing them for 
food.
Similarly, Cora Diamond points out that humans reject emphatically the practice of 
eating our own dead, not because we think that we have a moral duty not to engage in 
this practice, but rather because we have relationships with and attitudes toward humans 
in light of which it simply makes no sense to eat them. To eat a human body is to commit 
a kind of category error. Committing this error expresses a kind of disregard for the mis-
categorized subject, by placing them in the category of the edible rather than in the cate-
gory of the personal.28
Building on Diamond’s line of argument, Lori Gruen has argued that what is wrong 
with eating animals is that:29
[I]n turning other animals from living subjects with lives of their own into com-
modities or consumable objects we have erased their subjectivity and reduced them 
to things . . . [This] forecloses another way of seeing animals, as beings with whom 
we can empathize and learn to understand and respond to differences.
Finally (though there are other examples too), Carol Adams argues that:30
[M]eat-eating offers the grounds for subjugating animals: if we can kill, butcher, and 
consume them—in other words, completely annihilate them—we may as well 
experiment upon them, trap and hunt them, exploit them, and raise them in envi-
ronments that imprison them, such as factory and fur-bearing animal farms.
Recent psychological research on the so-called meat paradox empirically confirms 
these claims. For example, in a series of five studies, Brock Bastian and colleagues have 
demonstrated a link between seeing animals as food, on one hand, and seeing animals as 
having diminished mental lives and moral value, on the other hand. We will here describe 
three.
In a first study, participants were asked to rate the degree to which each of a diverse 
group of thirty-two animals possessed ten mental capacities, and then were asked how 
likely they would be to eat the animal and how wrong they believe eating that animal is. 
Perceived edibility was negatively associated with mind possession (r = –.42, p < .001), 
which was in turn associated with how the perceived wrongness of eating the animal (r 
= .80, p < .001).31
In a second study, participants were asked to eat dried beef or dried nuts and then 
judge a cow’s cognitive abilities and desert of moral treatment on two seven-point scales. 
Participants in the beef condition (M = 5.57) viewed the cow as significantly less deserv-
ing of moral concern than those in the control condition (M = 6.08).32
28 Diamond (1978, 467). 29 Gruen (2011, 103).
30 Adams (2015, 100).
31 Bastian et al. (2012, 249–250). 32 Loughnan, Haslam, and Bastian (2010).
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In a third study, participants were informed about Papua New Guinea’s tree kangaroo 
and informed variably that tree kangaroos have a steady population, that they are killed 
by storms, that they are killed for food, or that they are foraged for food. Bastian and col-
leagues found that categorizing tree kangaroos as food and no other features of these 
cases led participants to attribute less capacity for suffering and less moral concern.33
Additionally, a sequence of five studies from Jonas Kunst and Sigrid Hohle demon-
strates that processing meat, beheading a whole roasted pig, watching a meat advertise-
ment without a live animal versus one with a live animal, describing meat production as 
“harvesting” versus “killing” or “slaughtering,” and describing meat as “beef/pork” rather 
than “cow/pig” all decreased empathy for the animal in question and, in several cases, sig-
nificantly increased willingness to eat meat rather than an alternative vegetarian dish.34
Psychologists involved in these and several other studies35 believe that these phe-
nomena occur because people recognize an incongruity between eating animals and 
seeing them as beings with mental life and moral status, so they are motivated to resolve 
this cognitive dissonance by lowering their estimation of animal sentience and moral 
status. Since these affective attitudes influence the decisions we make—from our con-
sumer behavior to our voting behavior, political advocacy, career choice, philanthropic 
activity, conversations we have with others, and more— eating meat and embracing the 
idea of animals as food negatively influences our individual and social treatment of non-
human animals.
Part two of our argument—that eating animal products in exceptional cases makes us 
likely to eat animal products in ordinary cases—has precedent as well. Recall that a cen-
tral reason why Hare and other consequentialists support simpler decision procedures 
is that more complex decision procedures have more adjustable parameters that allow 
for false rationalization.
Following this line of reasoning, we can predict that a policy of not eating animal 
products at all will generally be better than a policy of eating animal products only in 
narrowly circumscribed contexts. Self-identified “conscientious omnivores” who claim 
to eat animal products only in circumstances where farmed animals have positive well-
being are likely to eat animal products in circumstances where farmed animals have 
negative well-being as well. In particular, they are likely to rationalize eating animal 
products not only on the grounds that animals experience diminished pain or have 
diminished moral status, but also on other grounds, such as that they are at a family din-
ner, that a particular restaurant probably has ethical practices, or even that a particular 
item on the menu looks appealing.
Here, again, psychological research supports armchair theory. A 2015 study revealed 
that “conscientious omnivores” were less likely than vegetarians to perceive their diet as 
something that they needed to follow. They reported violating their diet more, feeling 
less guilty when doing so, feeling less disgusted by factory-farmed meat, and believing 
33 Bratanova, Loughnan, and Bastian (2011). 34 Kunst and Hohle (2016).
35 Buttlar and Walther (2019).
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less in animal rights, among other findings.36 Moreover, diet had a statistically signifi-
cant effect on all measures independent of whether the diet was motivated by health or 
ethical reasons. Whether one is a vegetarian or a conscientious omnivore appears to 
change one’s psychological relationship to meat and to meat-eating, with implications 
for how consistently one applies one’s policy. Note also that these self-reports are 
unlikely to capture cases in which individuals see themselves as complying with their 
policy when they are in fact violating it, or cases in which individuals see themselves as 
violating their policy but would rather not admit that.
We are now in a position to see that, even if an individual might be morally permitted 
to be a “conscientious omnivore” rather than a vegetarian in principle (i.e., in cases that 
idealize away facts about human psychology), most individuals have strong (in our view 
decisive) reason not to be “conscientious omnivores” rather than vegetarians in practice 
(i.e., in cases that do not idealize away facts about human psychology). Because of the 
indirect effects of conforming to a policy of eating animals sometimes, a policy of not 
eating animals at all will do more good overall. Thus, consequentialists have strong (in 
our view decisive) reason to adopt a policy of not eating animals at all, except perhaps in 
highly exceptional cases where doing so clearly does more good than harm. More gener-
ally, we have strong (in our view decisive) reason to adopt a policy of supporting beliefs, 
values, and practices that treat animals as subjects rather than as objects, and that culti-
vate relationships of care rather than exploitation with them.
3.3. The Social Effects of Animal Exploitation
We now consider the social effects of animal exploitation. (Here we focus on the social 
effects of systems of animal exploitation themselves, though we believe that individual 
support for these systems can have social effects, too.)37 Once again, our argument has a 
dual structure, taking the impact of animal farming on human attitudes as one premise 
and our skepticism about the possibility of restricting ourselves to net positive versions 
of this practice as another.
Our central contention is that, because animal agriculture is necessarily a system of 
institutionalized violence against nonhuman animals, the existence of any such system 
will tend to socially perpetuate a speciesist ideological orientation toward nonhuman 
animals, diminishing the moral status that society predicates to them. This will, in turn, 
lead to both systematic violations of compliance with the standards of farming which 
LARDER requires and to other harmful actions regarding nonhuman animals and other 
sentient beings.
Animal farming serves as the grounds of its own ideological justification. The very 
fact that animal farming exists makes us more likely to see it as acceptable, in part by 
36 Rothgerber (2015).
37 For discussion of the social effects of individual support for systems of animal exploitation, see 
Schlottmann and Sebo (2018, chap. 9).
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providing us with evidence that other people see it as acceptable. Moreover, the idea that 
humans can treat nonhumans as we do in animal farming provides an inferential justifi-
cation for all kinds of other practices and attitudes, including complacency with other 
systems of nonhuman exploitation and with wild animal suffering. Finally, the produc-
tion of agricultural imagery—which typically obscures rather than illuminates the reali-
ties of animal agriculture because it is funded by industry—establishes animal agriculture 
as a legitimate and permanent institution.38
The idea that a harmful or oppressive system can serve as its own ideological justifica-
tion is not new. Many people have made this point before, not only in the context of ani-
mal rights advocacy but also in the context of human rights advocacy. For example, in 
her work on prison abolitionism, Angela Davis argues that images of the prison system 
foster complacency with incarceration. In particular, Davis argues that media produc-
tions, especially in Hollywood, make the prison one of the “most important features of 
our image environment.”39
This has caused us to take the existence of prisons for granted. The prison has 
become a key ingredient of our common sense. It is there, all around us. We do not 
question whether it should exist. It has become so much a part of our lives that it 
requires a great feat of the imagination to envision life beyond the prison.
Despite our constant consumption of prisons, the “realities of imprisonment are hid-
den from almost all who have not had the misfortune of doing time.”40 Cultural images 
of prisons obscure rather than illuminate the realities of the prison system, all while 
impressing upon us the necessity, naturalness, and permanence of an expansive system 
of incarceration. Meanwhile, the prison system functions to racialize punishment, asso-
ciating Blackness with criminality and with punishment.41
Many social and legal theorists believe that the law is similar, in that a central mech-
an ism through which the law yields conformity is by shaping perceived group norms 
and attitudes, thereby anchoring human moral attitudes and behavior.42 The law per-
forms this function both directly and indirectly. It performs this function directly when 
members of a society can infer from changing laws that a certain number of people must 
support the proposed norm. It performs this function indirectly when members of soci-
ety view other members following the law and infer that others must endorse the norm 
which the law enforces.43
The upshot is that the system of animal agriculture and the current legal status of ani-
mal agriculture work together to socially legitimize this system. They both shape per-
ceived group norms, anchoring our moral attitudes and behaviors. Members of a society 
can infer from the fact that the system of animal agriculture is legal in that society that 
38 Cf. Piazza et al. (2015); Gruen (2014). 39 Davis (2011, 18–19).
40 Davis (2011, 17). 41 Davis (2011, 22–39).
42 Bilz and Nadler (2009); Flores and Barclay (2015); Tankard and Paluck (2016); Tankard and 
Paluck (2017).
43 Bilz and Nadler (2009), 104.
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most people in that society support confining, killing, and eating animals (and are right 
to do so). If so, then a legal system of animal agriculture works in multiple ways to justify 
its own existence, as well as to inferiorize nonhuman animals.
The importance of these effects should not be understated. As some effective altruists 
argue, some of the very most important interventions that we can perform to improve 
the total value of the world are aimed at “moral circle expansion.” To aim for moral circle 
expansion is to aim for a wider range of sentient beings to receive moral consideration 
over time. The idea here is that the values of future generations will make a vast differ-
ence to the value of the future—for example, they could change whether these people 
will support or resist protections for domesticated animals, wild animals, or even digital 
beings. Moreover, because the number of future nonhuman sentient beings is extremely 
large in expectation, any difference we can make to the moral behavior of future genera-
tions regarding nonhuman sentient beings is astronomical in expected value.44 Thus, if 
institutionalized animal agriculture is an obstacle in the way of moral circle expansion, 
removing this obstacle should be a central moral priority for consequentialists.
Next, notice that a society that maintains a system of animal agriculture in the narrow 
contexts in which this system is a net benefit for farmed animals will doubtfully be able 
to contain its farming practices to these contexts. In countries with developed, industri-
alized economies, animal agriculture manages to produce animal products at scale only 
by producing them at very low cost to industry. This in turn requires industry to adopt 
very minimal space requirements, veterinary care, and regulation and oversight, while 
using genetically modified species whose rapid growth, reproductive efficiency, and 
hormonal excesses leave them chronically ill and in pain. A system of animal agriculture 
that provides farmed animals with positive well-being would require drastic revisions to 
all of these features of animal agriculture, each significantly raising the economic costs 
of production. While we cannot here build a quantitative model, suffice it to say that we 
are highly skeptical of the possibility of building a system of animal farming that both 
benefits farmed animals and feeds anyone beyond the very wealthiest humans.
These concerns might not fully apply to subsistence animal farming with dramati-
cally lower stocking density in countries without developed, industrialized economies. 
But while this system of animal farming might be able to maintain animal welfare stan-
dards conducive to the LARDER over the short term, capitalist selective pressures may 
eventually favor the development of industrial systems of animal farming to which our 
concerns will apply fully. Thus, perhaps barring rare cases where animal products are 
nutritionally mandated, it is plausible that consequentialists should endorse a policy of 
not farming animals anywhere. With that said, our focus in this chapter is on animal 
farming in the context of developed, industrialized economies, and so we will not try to 
argue for this more general policy here.
The upshot of these discussions is that consequentialists have strong reason to reject 
LARDER at the level of decision procedure. In particular, we should accept principles 
44 For more on the overwhelming importance of shaping the far future for determining right action 
for consequentialists, see Beckstead (2013) and Greaves and MacAskill (unpublished manuscript).
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which forbid increasing and require decreasing the population of farmed animals, and 
which forbid eating animals and otherwise supporting the idea that animals are food in 
all but the most exceptional cases. To be clear about the structure of our argument, what 
these considerations do is raise the moral costs of meat-eating and animal farming. We 
think that these costs are sufficiently high that the benefits of positive well-being for 
some farmed animals do not outweigh the costs in all but the most fanciful cases. Once 
we combine the indirect considerations that we have discussed here with the direct con-
siderations that we discussed earlier (about the expected animal welfare, public health, 
and environmental impacts of animal agriculture in the real world), the case for aboli-
tion of animal agriculture becomes even stronger.
As with any decision procedure, this partly consequentialist, partly nonconsequen-
tialist decision procedure is likely to produce at least some blameless wrongdoing. While 
eating animals and performatively condoning animal farming will ordinarily be harm-
ful, they might sometimes be beneficial. Moreover, while we might sometimes clearly 
see when we are in an exceptional case where this is beneficial, we will not always clearly 
see that. But this is fine. Since no one short of an archangel has the psychological capac-
ity to act optimifically in every choice situation, the best we can do is identify the gov-
erning policies that minimize expected wrongdoing over the long run. Our view is that 
for most people in most situations, this partly consequentialist, partly nonconsequen-
tialist decision procedure does exactly that.
We should note three caveats about our argument here. First, we are not sure to what 
degree the social and psychological impacts of meat production and consumption 
extend to other forms of animal use, including the use of animals for eggs, dairy, cloth-
ing, research, entertainment, and companionship. We predict that these social and psy-
chological impacts will be strongest in the case of meat production and consumption, 
but that they will at least be present in the context of other forms of harmful or oppres-
sive use. At the limit, there will be instances of use such as the consumption of plastics 
made from animal byproducts that are so psychologically divorced from animal use that 
they may have no individual psychological impacts at all. But this is an empirical hypoth-
esis that requires empirical investigation.
Second, as with any empirical psychological findings, we are not sure to what degree 
there may be variation in the attitudes toward farmed animals and other sentient beings 
that people form as a result of consuming animal products and living in a society that 
uses animals for food. Thus, we are not sure to what degree there is variation in the deci-
sion procedures that will help people to maximize net pleasure in the world, given these 
psychological impacts. The psychological effects that we have discussed in this section 
appear to be robust, but we should not expect this to be a human psychological univer-
sal. Note that since we cannot typically assess our own levels of bias introspectively, we 
should all assume that we are likely to be subject to the biases described.
Third, we are not sure to what degree there might be exceptional cases where meat 
production and consumption is morally permissible or required at the decision proce-
dure level. We can at least imagine cases where producing or consuming meat would 
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clearly be optimal, such that we should suspend animal rights that we normally regard 
as absolute. But note that such a case would have to be truly exceptional; that is, it would 
have to be the kind of case that might warrant suspending human rights as well. Other 
than cases where people need to produce or consume meat to survive (which are not as 
common as “conscientious omnivores” think, though they do occur), we expect that 
such cases will be rare, though we cannot say for sure.
Many people criticize animal advocates for focusing too much on consumer action 
and not enough on other kinds of political action. We agree with this criticism, which is 
part of why we recommend advocacy that aims not only at individual consumer change 
but also at social, political, economic, and technological change. However, we also think 
that individual consumer change is more important than some critics realize. When we 
distance ourselves from systems of violence, we are able to see these systems for what 
they are and to find the motivation to resist them in other ways.
4. Wild Animals and the Logic  
of the Logger
4.1. Background
The idea that consequentialists should aim to conserve wild animal populations, all else 
being equal, relies on the assumption that wild animals generally have positive well-
being. And it makes sense that people would make this assumption. After all, wild ani-
mals do experience positive well-being in their lives. They enjoy food, sex, play, 
relationships, and a range of comforting solitary and interpersonal experiences.
However, some consequentialists believe that wild animals have negative well-being. 
Granted, they might have ample opportunity for positive experience. But they also face 
ample risk of negative experience, resulting from hunger, thirst, illness, injury, preda-
tion, and more. Moreover, most wild animals are small animals who are members of 
“r-selected” species. Such animals achieve population equilibrium by giving birth to 
very many offspring with extremely high mortality rates. Oscar Horta offers the exam-
ple of Atlantic Cods, who maintain population equilibrium by spawning around two 
million eggs per year, only one of which, on average, will reach adulthood. Thus, the vast 
majority of wild animals who exist, assuming they are sentient, have very short, painful 
lives that consist mainly of dying.
Such observations have led many commentators to note that if most wild animals 
have negative well-being, then the world could be improved simply by ending the lives 
of these animals and destroying their habitats, an argument which we have titled “The 
Logic of the Logger” (LOGGER). For example, effective altruist blogger Brian Tomasik 
argues that “[g]iven that most wild animals that are born have net-negative experiences, 
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loss of wildlife habitat should in general be encouraged rather than opposed.”45 Whereas 
people like Yew-Kwang Ng encourage “extreme caution before we do anything that may 
disturb the biosphere,”46 Tomasik argues that such caution is unwarranted and encour-
ages us to adopt a strong “anti-conservationist” stance.
The idea here is that if consequentialism is true, and if wild animals have negative 
well-being, then there is a pro tanto moral reason to promote a world that excludes 
these wild animals instead of a world that includes them. This might mean that we have 
pro tanto moral reasons to engage in hunting, fishing, and as Tomasik argues, activities 
aimed at “decreasing plant growth and entirely eliminating wilderness.” Some defenders 
of the Logic of the Logger further suppose that these moral reasons are ultimately 
undefeated, such that, all things considered, consequentialists ought to engage in such 
anti-conservationist activities.
As with LARDER, the weakest version of LOGGER makes conservative assumptions 
about population axiology. It assumes only that it is not bad for there to be fewer wild 
animals with negative well-being. While there are population axiologies that sometimes 
deny this, such as averageism and some impartial forms of egalitarianism, the claim that 
it is not bad for there to be fewer sentient beings with negative well-being is a highly 
plausible desideratum for population axiology. The strongest version of LOGGER, sup-
ported by classical utilitarianism, implies that destroying animals and ecosystems is 
required because it is bad for wild animals with negative well-being to exist.
Because LOGGER is a very new argument, discussed mostly on internet blogs and in 
op-eds, few philosophers have commented on the issue. Those who have commented 
have made similar responses to LOGGER as to LARDER.47 In particular, they have 
replied by rejecting consequentialism, by rejecting the idea that consequentialism sup-
ports reducing wild animal populations, and by accepting the idea that consequential-
ism supports this. Especially important have been arguments that (a) wild animals do 
not clearly experience net negative well-being,48 and (b) the possibility of unpredictable 
trophic cascades makes it difficult if not impossible to identify habitat destruction meth-
ods that will do more good than harm overall.49
As with LARDER, we are sympathetic with all of these replies. However, we think that 
we should accept these replies only on a consequentialist interpretation, and that when 
we do, we will see that there is a deeper reason for consequentialists to reject LOGGER; 
that is, even treating LOGGER as an open question is likely to be a net harm for nonhu-
man animals and other sentient beings in practice, for precisely the reasons that lead 
people to reject consequentialism.
Our aim in what follows, then, is to argue that, for a variety of reasons, a consequen-
tialist criterion of rightness requires us to accept a partly nonconsequentialist decision 
procedure, and that this decision procedure conflicts with destroying animals and eco-
systems at present (with certain caveats that we will explain). In particular, it requires us 
45 Tomasik (2017a). 46 Ng (1995).
47 Donaldson and Kymlicka (2011); Singer (2011); Tomasik (2017a). 48 Groff and Ng (2019).
49 Delon and Purves (2018).
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to place significant weight on protecting wild animal autonomy, cultivating virtuous 
character traits toward wild animals, and cultivating relationships of care with wild ani-
mals. This is centrally because exterminating animals negatively shapes our individual 
beliefs, values, and practices, and because living without wild animals altogether nega-
tively shapes our collective beliefs, values, and practices. As earlier, in both cases, the 
result is that we tend to have attitudes that devalue animals and practices that harm 
them. However, we want to emphasize that we are less confident about how to evaluate 
LOGGER than about how to evaluate LARDER, for reasons that we will explain later.
4.2. The Individual Effects of Animal Extermination
We begin with the individual effects of animal extermination. We here focus on the indi-
vidual effects of activities such as hunting, fishing, logging, and land development for 
human use, though we will consider later whether and to what degree these effects apply 
to other activities that reduce wild animal populations, too.
Our argument has two parts, which in many ways parallel the argument against 
LARDER.50 First, we contend that participating in standard forms of extermination 
conditions humans to view animals as expendable, as inferior, and ultimately as having 
diminished moral status relative to humans. That is, when we performatively condone 
the killing of animals, directly or indirectly, in a way that treats these animals as mere 
means and undermines their agency, we condition ourselves to devalue and, as a result, 
harm other animals. Second, the more we open ourselves up to engaging in such prac-
tices in cases where they are a net benefit, the more willing we will be to support and 
engage in such practices in cases where they are not. Thus, we will argue, consequential-
ists should adopt a policy of not destroying animals and ecosystems by these means at all 
(with certain caveats that we will discuss).
Our first argument against LARDER focused centrally on two empirically validated 
social-psychological phenomena. First is the point that meat-eating creates psychologi-
cal dissonance in people which they resolve by attributing lower mental life and moral 
status to nonhuman animals. Second is the closely related point that when people 
observe meat-eating, they infer that the people eating meat do not think that nonhuman 
animals are minded beings with moral standing. In our view, the best explanation for 
these findings is that people have at least partly deontological moral intuitions. If non-
human animals have sentience and moral standing, they must be the kinds of beings 
who it is wrong to kill, eat, and exploit for human benefit. But since, the meat-eater 
judges, I and others do kill, eat, and exploit animals for human benefit, they must not 
have sentience and moral standing.
If many people have these kinds of moral intuitions, then we can predict that partici-
pating in the destruction of wild animals and their habitats will have similar conse-
quences as participating in animal agriculture (again, covarying with the degree and 
50 As with our arguments in Section 3.2, our arguments in Section 4.2 assume actualism.
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kind of participation). That is, we can predict that this activity would cultivate within us 
an ideology of human supremacism (again, covarying with the degree and kind of par-
ticipation). All of us have internalized deeply the idea that humans are the kinds of 
beings with whom we should have relationships of care, and that such relationships do 
not involve the kinds of violence and agency denial that is central to practices of hunt-
ing, fishing, and habitat destruction. Participating in these practices, then, creates dif-
ferential psychological constructs regarding humans and other animals. Because we 
have also internalized the idea that building relationships of care with others is morally 
important, this may well lead us to accept that our relationships with other animals are 
not as morally important as our relationships with other humans. Since these affective 
attitudes influence the decisions we make—from our recreational behavior to our vot-
ing behavior, political advocacy, career choice, philanthropic activity, conversations we 
have with others, and more—participating in the destruction of wild animals and their 
habitats negatively influences our individual and social treatment of nonhuman animals.
Brian Tomasik has argued explicitly against this kind of reasoning, urging us to help 
now and cultivate attitudes and relationships of care later.51 Tomasik invites us to 
consider:
[W]hat kinds of values are we trying to promote within society? Are we trying to 
promote the idea of holding back on doing the right thing because of how others 
may misinterpret it? . . . I think the ideology question isn’t settled, because there’s 
also value in challenging prevailing assumptions in the animal movement and pro-
moting a culture of compassionate consequentialism, which could reduce the likeli-
hood that the animal movement neglects huge sources of suffering in the future in 
the way it currently neglects . . . wild-animal suffering.
We agree with Tomasik that consequentialists should aim to cultivate and promote 
the virtues of responding with urgency and calculated efficiency to the suffering of non-
human sentient beings. This may well require intervening to improve the welfare of wild 
animals sooner rather than later. But we nevertheless disagree with Tomasik on two sig-
nificant points.
First, while consequentialists should cultivate virtues of urgency and efficiency, and 
while doing so sometimes conflicts with cultivating relationships of care, we believe that 
these activities are for the most part complementary. For example, if we aspire to respect 
wild animal life and autonomy while benefiting wild animals as much as possible within 
these constraints, such as by aiding them with medical intervention, reducing human 
and domesticated animal predation, and researching effective interventions into wild 
animal suffering, we can cultivate and promote anti-speciesist ideology and a concern 
for urgency and efficiency at the same time.
Second, consequentialists should be concerned about cultivating relationships of care 
with nonhuman animals not only because others are liable to misinterpret altruistically 
motivated extermination as speciesist, but also because we are liable to reinforce spe-
51 Tomasik (2016). Cf. Tomasik (2017b).
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cies ism within ourselves and others whether or not we are misinterpreting our behavior 
as speciesist. The issue here is that participation in destroying animals and their envi-
ronments would condition us to see them as having less sentience and moral standing 
independently of how we interpret our behavior. Granted, some interpretations might 
cause this effect to be larger than others. But we are suggesting that the effect would be 
present either way.
One aspect of our argument against LARDER focused on the observation that com-
plex decision procedures have adjustable parameters that allow for false rationalization. 
We think that this consideration supports establishing deontological, virtue-theoretic, 
and care-theoretic constraints on our utilitarian activity for domesticated animals and 
wild animals alike. In short, consequentialists should adopt decision procedures that 
pro tanto prohibit harming or killing nonhuman animals merely as means to further 
ends for much the same reason they should do so in the case of humans: the more we 
engage in such practices in anything other than clearly exceptional cases, the more will-
ing we will be to engage in such practices in a wide range of cases that do not plausibly 
benefit wild animals.
In light of these considerations, we find it plausible that, even if an individual might 
be morally permitted to altruistically engage in wild animal extermination and habitat 
destruction in principle (i.e., in cases that idealize away facts about human psychology), 
most individuals are not morally permitted to take these actions in practice (i.e., in cases 
that do not idealize away facts about human psychology). Given the negative indirect 
effects of a policy of participating in the destruction of animals and habitats sometimes, 
a policy of not participating at all will do more good overall. Thus, ordinary consequen-
tialists should instead adopt a policy of not participating at all, except perhaps in highly 
exceptional cases where doing so clearly does more good than harm.
With that said, we ultimately agree with Tomasik that these questions are unsettled. 
How we should resolve LOGGER will depend on our answers to many questions, espe-
cially questions about wild animal well-being and population ethics. Given how many 
wild animals there are, we are open to the possibility that the value of reducing their suf-
fering via habitat destruction outweighs the value of reducing suffering more generally 
by cultivating virtues and relationships of care. For that reason, we are not claiming that 
LOGGER fails, but are rather claiming that it fails at present given our current epistemic 
state (which includes uncertainty about how much well-being wild animals have at 
present and could have in the future). On our best judgment, consequentialists should 
focus for now on helping wild animals in ways that respect their lives and autonomy, and 
on laying the groundwork for respectful, compassionate, and effective systematic inter-
ventions to reduce wild animal suffering in the future, as we will now discuss.
4.3. The Social Effects of Animal Extermination
We now consider the social effects of exterminating animals. (As earlier, we focus on the 
social effects of systems of animal extermination themselves, though we believe that 
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individual support for these systems can have social effects, too.) In this case, we must 
consider not only the social effects of living in a world with legally sanctioned destruc-
tion of wild animals and habitats, but also the social effects of living in the world that this 
activity would bring about. Since the former effects are easier to infer from our earlier 
discussion than our analysis of the latter effects, we will focus on the latter effects here.
In particular, we will focus on three possible ways of structuring society: living with 
wild animals, living without wild animals (or at least, living with fewer wild animals) via 
domestication, and living without wild animals (or at least, living with fewer wild animals) 
via extinction. Of course, in focusing on these options, we are not suggesting that they are 
exhaustive, since various combinations are possible as well. We suggest only that an initial 
focus on these options helps us to see clearly some of the relevant considerations.
Our argument has two parts. First, we contend that each alternative arrangement has 
its own ideological costs and benefits, significantly determining the possible relation-
ships we could have with sentient beings in the future. Second, pursuing the best version 
of each arrangement is no guarantee that we will achieve that version, and we may 
instead be left with a warped version that looks more like a dystopian version of the sta-
tus quo.
Consider first the effect that learning to live with wild animals might have. In the best 
case, we could learn to live with wild animals in a radical new way, respecting their lives 
and autonomy while intervening into their affairs to improve their well-being. This 
approach has the advantage of being more achievable than other approaches we will dis-
cuss. It would challenge human supremacism, producing an ideology of respect and 
compassion for sentient beings and teaching us lessons about coexistence and coopera-
tion.52 However, this approach would likely leave unaddressed some of the most signifi-
cant sources of wild animal suffering, such as predation and r-selection.
Of course, there is a nontrivial chance that, if we choose to live with wild animals, we 
would not realize this best-case scenario. As Tomasik argues, it would be easy for us to 
slide back into our current state of indifference. In this case, we would neither improve 
the lives of wild animals nor challenge our current ideological presuppositions about 
wild animals and other sentient nonhuman beings. Our relationship with wild animals 
would continue to be one of mystery and awe, but also of alterity and indifference, char-
acterized by the belief that wild animals should be left alone except where their human 
interests can be served by interfering with their lives. While learning to live with wild 
animals raises the quasi-utopian possibility of forming radical relationships of respect, 
compassion, coexistence, and assistance, it also raises the dystopian possibility of leav-
ing the status quo forever intact.
Consider second the effect that learning to live without wild animals (or at least, living 
with fewer wild animals) via domestication might have. In the best case, we could domes-
ticate wild animals by pursuing radical forms of sanctuary that look little like the current 
status quo for domesticated animals. Such forms of sanctuary would parentalistically 
give humans control over the forms of life wild animals could pursue, but would also be 
52 Gruen (2015).
0004850007.INDD   584 6/5/2020   3:45:12 AM
OUP UNCORRECTED AUTOPAGE PROOFS – FIRST PROOF, 06/05/2020, SPi
Dictionary: NOAD
Consequentialism and Nonhuman Animals   585
as deferential as possible to the revealed preferences of these animals. This system would 
provide wild animals with much higher levels of well-being on average, and it would also 
disrupt human supremacist ideology by teaching us lessons of care, responsibility, and 
stewardship. At the same time, it would be costly to develop and maintain, and it would 
risk reinforcing a diminished view of animal agency.
Again, there is a nontrivial chance that, if we choose to domesticate wild animals, we 
would not realize this best-case scenario. If advocates pursued the domestication of wild 
animals but without challenging our assumptions of human superiority, or if we contin-
ued to pursue conservation through our current frameworks, this could lead us to 
impose on wild animals the status quo for animals living under human domestication, 
for example, confining wild animals in zoos. This system would provide domesticated 
wild animals with relatively low well-being, and it might also reinforce much the same 
ideology as zoos, teaching us “a false sense of our place in the natural order.”53 While 
domesticating wild animals raises the quasi-utopian possibility of forming radical rela-
tionships of care, responsibility, and stewardship, it also raises the dystopian possibility 
of imposing the current status quo for domesticated animals on a much higher propor-
tion of sentient beings than we currently do.
Consider finally the effect that learning to live without wild animals (or at least, living 
with fewer wild animals) via extinction would have on human ideology. In the best case, 
we could bring about the extinction of wild animals through deliberate and cautious 
intervention that minimizes wild animal suffering and respects wild animal agency as 
much as possible. This would result in a world with little to no wild animal suffering. It 
may also teach us lessons of care for the suffering of sentient beings as well as lessons of 
caution about the hazards inherent in the very existence of sentient life. However, it also 
risks reinforcing the harmful idea that we should respond to the suffering of others 
(human and nonhuman alike) by seeking to control or eliminate the sufferers rather 
than by helping to reduce or eliminate their suffering.54
Once again, there is a nontrivial chance that, if we choose to bring about the extinc-
tion of wild animals, we would not realize this best-case scenario. For if advocates push 
for the extinction of wild animals without challenging our assumptions of human supe-
riority, we could bring about the extinction of wild animals through the means that have 
come to be the status quo: incautiously destroying wild animal habitats through hunt-
ing, fishing, development, and more. This might still lead to a world with no wild animal 
suffering. However, it would also reinforce our ideology of human supremacism, teach-
ing us that nonhuman animals are not deserving of the same kind of respect as human 
beings. Moreover, such a radically incautious process of total annihilation would leave a 
53 Jamieson (1985).
54 This oppressive idea can harm humans as well. For example, in cases where people with mental 
and physical difference are suffering, many people see this suffering as a reason to reduce mental and 
physical difference in the world, rather than as a reason to create a world that can accommodate mental 
and physical difference. For more on this subject, see Foucault (1988), Mitchell-Brody and Sebo 
(unpublished manuscript), and Taylor (2017).
0004850007.INDD   585 6/5/2020   3:45:12 AM
OUP UNCORRECTED AUTOPAGE PROOFS – FIRST PROOF, 06/05/2020, SPi
Dictionary: NOAD
586   Tyler M. John and Jeff Sebo
trail of immense suffering in its wake, with many wild animals dying slow and painful 
deaths of deprivation.
As we can see, all three of these possible futures carry costs and benefits, both directly 
(via our impact on wild animals) and indirectly (via our impact on human ideology). 
This is true for both the ideal and the nonideal versions of these possible futures.
It can be tempting to draw a strong conclusion on the basis of these considerations, 
but our view is that these considerations are far too preliminary to support such conclu-
sions. After all, we remain highly uncertain about the experiences of wild animals, about 
the feasibility of each system, about the costs and opportunity costs of pursuing each 
system, and much more.
It can also be tempting not to draw a conclusion at all, instead urging caution until we 
have much more information. But we must remember that a precautionary approach is, 
in practice, a choice to maintain a status quo that involves the continuing suffering of 
possibly septillions of sentient beings.
All things considered, our own weakly held view is that we should wait to take sys-
tematic action. If advocates invest resources in building capacity for research on reduc-
ing wild animal suffering and advocacy for the moral and political standing of wild 
animals, then we will likely be much better able to take informed and effective action in 
a few decades than we are now.55 At present, we are not yet willing to take large-scale 
action for the sake of wild animals, and even if we were, we are not yet able to take such 
action without destabilizing the entire biosphere. Granted, playing the long game car-
ries the cost of preserving the status quo in the short term. However, this cost is rela-
tively minor compared to the epistemic and practical resources we can expect to gain 
through research and advocacy, given how few resources we have at the present time.
To be clear about the structure of our argument, what these social psychological con-
siderations do is raise the moral costs of destroying wild animals and ecosystems. We 
think that these expected costs are sufficiently high that the expected benefit of eliminat-
ing negative well-being in wild animals does not outweigh them. Once we combine this 
consideration with the considerations that we discussed earlier (about our uncertainty 
about the total welfare of wild animals and the unpredictable consequences of interven-
tion), the case for adopting a quasi-conservationist ethic becomes even stronger.
As earlier, this partly consequentialist, partly nonconsequentialist decision proce-
dure is likely to result in at least some blameless wrongdoing. There might be some cases 
where destroying wild animals and habitats is best, and where we are not in a position to 
see that an exception is warranted. But again, this is fine. No decision procedure is per-
fect, and our suggestion is only that this partly consequentialist, partly nonconsequen-
tialist decision procedure is best for most people in most situations at present.
We should stress that our argument is tentative. We are suggesting that LOGGER fails 
at present, given our current information state. Consequentialists have strong (in our 
view decisive) reason to reject LOGGER for now, and to instead accept principles which 
forbid destroying wild animals and ecosystems in all but the most exceptional cases. To 
55 Cf. Schubert and Garfinkel (2017).
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be clear, we can imagine changing our minds with more information. For example, if we 
come to think that the aggregate well-being of wild animals is bad enough that the harm 
of allowing them to exist clearly outweighs the harm (both to wild animals and to other 
sentient beings) of cultivating and promoting human supremacist beliefs, values, and 
practices, we might come to think that LOGGER succeeds. However, we are currently 
skeptical that we will reach this conclusion.
5. Conclusion: Future Technology, 
Future Directions
Anti-speciesist consequentialists and nonconsequentialists can agree that factory farm-
ing and wild animal welfare are two of the very highest-priority areas on which to spend 
scarce resources. However, many have supposed that consequentialists and nonconse-
quentialists are forced to disagree about the means of helping farmed animals and wild 
animals. Defenders of the Logic of the Larder have argued that consequentialism some-
times requires eating farmed animals in order to ensure that animals with positive well-
being exist, while defenders of the Logic of the Logger have argued that consequentialism 
sometimes requires destroying wild animals and ecosystems in order to ensure that ani-
mals with negative well-being do not exist. In this chapter, we have argued that the Logic 
of the Larder and the Logic of the Logger both underestimate the importance of indirect 
decision procedures. In particular, they underestimate the role that our individual and 
collective policies play in shaping our moral attitudes and behavior and they underesti-
mate the importance of accepting policies that are robust against harmful deviation. 
Once we have properly accounted for these considerations, it is clear that the Logic of 
the Larder fails and it is unclear that the Logic of the Logger succeeds.
We can expect future technological change to bring with it new and immense chal-
lenges for consequentialist moral theorists and advocates. Where the variety and num-
ber of farmed animals and wild animals have raised cluelessness and demandingness 
challenges for consequentialism, future sentient beings such as artificially intelligent 
minds will introduce even more varied and numerous minds into the world, thereby 
exacerbating these challenges even further. As a result, we can expect these advances to 
raise many new and difficult questions about the practical implications of consequen-
tialism and about its deviation from nonconsequentialism. If we are wise, we will begin 
to develop and answer some of these questions now, before we have another moral trag-
edy on the scale of factory farming or wild animal suffering on our hands. It will be diffi-
cult to know, in advance, what kinds of future sentient beings might exist as technology 
continues to advance with increasingly accelerating returns, or when we will even rec-
ognize these sentient beings as sentient beings. But for precisely these reasons, we need 
to begin, now, to determine how consequentialism requires us to act in the face of such 
massive uncertainty, and we must work to identify, now, the indirect decision heuristics 
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that will guide us away from moral dystopia before it arrives, rather than responding to 
it once it is already here.
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